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THE OCEAN SPACE PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
Very recent developments In marine science and engineering
have dramatically demonstrated a potential capacity for public
and private entities with sufficient skill and wealth to harvast
the vast resources of ocean space at water depths far beyond the
present limits of all national territorial sovereignty. There
are in consequence reasonable expectations that in the future, as
more knowledge is gained through ever increasing research, mankind
will be able to explore and exploit the ocean environment at depths
once thought as inaccessible as the surface of the moon.
Not only are unmanned scientific data collection instruments
being used today to monitor the ocean deeps, but projects are now
in progress to put man himself on the floor of the ocean. These
man-ln-the-sea projects are still limited to relatively shallow
depths with inhabitation for comparatively short periods of time,
but improvements will inevitably permit an advance to the greater
depths of the ocean. The first substantial penetration of the deep
sea by a manned instrumentality will undoubtedly be achieved first
by a movable submersible in the form of a specially constructed and
highly specialized submarine, but it is expected that eventually
tea
- vr
fixed installations will be lowered down to or constructed upon
the ocean floor for extended research by crews of scientists,
engineers and technicians. For some, it is not fanciful to look
ahead with the anticipation that these projects may someday
become the predecessors of "Inhabited villages on the ocean floor,"
for which today exists "the technology to start building them now.
Astronaut Scott Carpenter, who spent a month at a depth of 205 feet
in the Pacific Ocean with the Seaiab II project, recently answered
a question regarding the possibility of underwater colonies by
saying
:
Yes, Indeed. I don't think we'll have residen-
tial communities, although even that may be possible
someday. But, certainly, there will be industrial
communities permanently inhabited. There's no limit
on how big they could be—possibly a thousand people
or more.
^
If it can be taken as a first premise that man, for varying
purposes and for varying lengths of time, will someday inhabit
the ocean floor at greater and greater depths and in increasing
numbers, then a second premise inexorably follows from human na-
ture itself: sooner or later a criminal act will occur there.
Even though the initial ocean explorers are and will be highly
select personnel, it is not difficult to imagine that the rigor-
ous pressures and problems inherent in a confined environment
at the edge of human endurance may incubate a spontaneous private
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criminal act, such as, perhaps, mans laughter or murder. That
the latter is not wholly unimaginable is illustrated by a 197?"'
homicide, sparked by an argument between two technicians over a
jug of wine, which occurred on a small floating ice island in the
Arctic Ocean which was then being used as a 19-man United States
5
weather research station. The incident unfortunately gives
real-life content to an observation made in 1967 by Senator Pell
of Rhode Island
:
I know that as I have worked on my Sea Grant Col-
lege legislation, which calls for the practical exploi-
tation of the knowledge of the basic research that we
have, one could see the problems that will arise—the
man-made islands that will be created way outside the
continental limits; the mining settlements that will
exist under the seas where people will be living for
months on end. What happens in these areas if murder
is committed? What kind of law prevails? These are
the kind of questions that are absolutely without ans-
wer as of now.
6
The third premise is that the question of jurisdiction over
a criminal act which may be committed in a future underwater re-
search station, mining settlement or inhabited village is not go-
ing to be soon settled by international convention. In fact,
the question has so far generated no real interest among scholars
and even less among States. The reason, apart from the obviously
theoretical and superficially amusing nature of the problem, is
not hard to discover: possible criminal jurisdiction issues have
been completely submerged by the more heady economic aspects of
"•- •»
potential ocean wealth, which any review of the recent writings
and pronouncements concerning ocean space will adequately demon-
strate.' Although the tools and techniques for economical con-
quest of the deep sea are primarily in the costly experimental
stage, the future prospects are viewed with such enthusiasm that
world attention has bean captured by and focused upon the sea as
a possible solution to world economic problems. Stimulated by
a perhaps overly optimistic vision 01 marine riches, and fear-
ful that technologically advanced nations will seize the fruits
of the sea in a scrambling era of underwater colonialism, there
baa been a great deal of understandable concern building with re*
garc to the "ownership" of the seas. It is now apparent that a
package solution oi" the multifaceted seabed issues will be sought
for under the aegis of the United Nations, which has decided to
convene in 1973 another Conference on the Law of the Sea, and
it is not likely that such a complex task of decision will be
concluded very quickly since the participants in the process are in-
deed many and with differing objectives, for ail States, rich or
poor, large or small, coastal or landlocked, have a definite
a
interest in the ultimate allocation of authority over the seabed.
The conclusion that these three premises permit is that a
criminal act which may occur in a submarine habitation on the sea
bottom oust be analyzed in terms of existing doctrines and

principles of criminal jurisdiction, rhe issue presented is whether
these traditional doctrines satisfactorily encompass crime in so
novel an environment, and whether there may be a more desirable
approach with which to treat acts of criminality on the ocean
floor. The thesis that follows from an examinstion of the juris-
diction doctrines is that there is a problem indeed, and that the
traditional mechanical approach to jurisdiction involving inter-
national elements often leads to stretching and straining in order
to adapt old solutions to meet new needs* Although deep sea of-
fenses may be looked at as a narrow hypothetical problem, it pre-
sents an appropriate vehicle to suggest that there are broader is-
sues of criminal jurisdiction that should be raised if the inter-
national community is to cooperate In the minimum but necessary
objective of suppressing private crime committed in the interna-
9
tionai arena •! the seabed. A similar point has been made in a
discussion of the analogous situation in Antarctica:
In short, while the likelihood of an Antarctic
crime wave is clearly remote, the difficulties and em-
barrassment which even a single serious incident could
occasion appear to justify at least minimal legislation
to permit its orderly handling. Obviously the problem
does not justify a major legislative effort. On the
other hand, if simple and relatively non-controversial
legislation can provide a ready solution, it is diffi-
cult to see why this should not be done. At worst such
legislation might prove unnecessary. At best it could
anticipate and provide a means for dealing with other-
wise troublesome problems.*

6Legal-Spatial Divisions of Ocean Space
To Identify and delimit as far as possible the particular
seabed arena which is of present concern, a brief and primarily
conceptual description is necessary of the various juridical and
spatial zones into which ocean space has been divided. The most
relevant zones are the territorial sea, the high seas and the
continental shelf.
Territorial Sea
Extending seaward from the land shores of every coastal na-
tion is a belt of water known as the marginal or territorial sea.
his strip of adjacent water was historically claimed to be part
of the sovereign territory of the coastal State for the purpose
of providing protection from sea intruders, and since the effec-
tive power of the State to compel recognition of its claim reach-
ed no farther than the range of its shore-based cannon, the width
of the territorial sea was accepted in the 18th Century to be
about 3 miles. The combined claims of coastal States ultimate-
ly ripened into an established principle of customary and then
conventional international law, as represented in the open in;
article of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone: "The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its
land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent
to its coast, described as the territorial sea."*2 Within the

territorial sea the coastal State has exclusive control not only
over the water surface but also over the seabed am1 subsoil under
the surface.^ However, while agreement has been reached that
the landward baseline from which the width of the territorial sea
is measured is the normal low-water line, the Convention does
not go beyond the statement that the "outer limit of the terri-
torial sea is the line every point sjf which is at a distance from
the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea," leaving the actual width of the territorial sea a
matter of no little uncertainty.
High Seas
In 1609, when Grotius published his pamphlet Mare Liberum in
response to various State pretensions claiming broad rights over
extensive portions of the high seas, the principle was born that
no State could assert sovereignty over the high seas. This doc-
trine of the freedom of the seas, which precluded any acquisition
of the high seas as a part of State territory, ensured that the
oceans lying between and separating the nations of the earth re-
mained an would remain open to ail nations on an equal basis.*--
The principle, subject only to territorial sea claims, became the
paramount legal doctrine concerning the vast oceans of the earth,
and is now firmly entrenched in international law and recognized
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The high seas being open to all nations, no State
may validly purport to subject any pare of them to Its
sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas Is exercised
under the conditions laic' down by these articles and
by the other rules of international law. It compri-
ses, inter alia , both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(l> Freedom of navigation;
2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipe-
lines;
J
Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the
general principles of international law, shall be exer-
cised by all States with reasonable regard to the in-
terests of other States in their exercise of the free-
dom of the high seas.l^
The breadth ol the high seas is the converse question to the
width of the territorial sea since the onveution only provides
that "The term 'high sea' means all parts o^ the sea that are not
included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State.*" But whatever its precise limits, it is this high seas
portion of the legal-spatial division of ocean space that is of
interest here as the projected location of a hypothetical criminal
act.
Continental Shelf
The sea floor extending from one coast to another across the
ocean basin does not fail only in either the regime %t the high
seas or the regime of the territorial 3ea. There are two modern
"•ones which have been carved out as exceptions to the traditional
dichotomy t the territorial sea and the high seas. The first con-
cerns the water surface of the high seas and provides for a

"contiguous zone" seaward of the territorial sea, reaching not beyond
12 miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured, over which the coastal State is permitted to exercise
limited control to "prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations within its territorial sea."*°
The second modification to the traditional division essentially
began in 1945 when President Truman proclaimed that the United States,
in order to orotect and obtain natural resources lying offshore beyond
its territorial waters, would exercise jurisdiction and control over the
seabed and subsoil of the continental shell, an underwater extension
of the continental land mass gently sloping seaward before dec I ini.
steeply into the deep ocean. 2 This unilateral claim was quickly
followed by like claims from other coastal States and ultimately led
to a third multilateral agreement in the course of the 1958 Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea. The resultant Convention on the
continental Shelf permits the coastal State to exercise "over the
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources," and defines the shelf as follows:
For the purposes of these articles, the term, "con-
tinental shelf" is used as referring a) to the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth oi 2 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admit o the expioita-
tion oi: the natural resources al the said areas . . ..
It thus appears that there is a fairly certain allocation of
jurisdiction to the coastal tate over the sea floor from the
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low-water line on the shore out to a point where the water over the
continental shelf reaches a depth o 200 meters, and since the
Geneva Conventions allocate authority in terms of "sovereignty"
or "sovereign rights," there should be no difficulty in interna-
tional law in exercising criminal jurisdiction over that seabed
area as a part fi coastal State territory subject to territorial
criminal laws. But what is the situation beyond 200 meters (or 600
ieet) of depth?
Achievements and Expectations in ocean Space
70 understand the recent interest in ocean space and to ap-
preciate in context the many values that would be threatened by
lawlessness in so vast an arena as the deep seabed, it is essen-
tial to realize both the potential new benefits that may be ex-
pected from the sea and the considerable achievements that have
so far been accomplished. There can be no doubt that ocean
space, like outer space, is emerging as a significant frontier
for human effort*
Indicative of the recent awareness of the potential of the
seas is the increasing number of people involved in ocean science
and the amount o money that has been spent lor basic research in
this field. There has been, for example, a substantial increase
in the number oi college degrees awarueu ui marine science,^ and









the United States and at least 500 each in Japan, Russia, United
Kingdom and Canada. Furthermore , the funds allocated for marine
research are Impressive: President Nixon's budget request for
Fiscal Year 1971 provides $533.1 million for marine science and
technology, an increase from $514.3 million during the previous
fiscal year, and it is programmed that at least $2.5 billion in
Federal funds will be spent in oceanographic research over the next
5 years. In addition to the United States, 18 other countries
devote individually at least $500,000 annually for marine research
support.
Wealth Exploitation
In the first half of the 20th Century, the seas were primarily
used, in addition to their strategic importance, for food and trans-
portation. These traditional utilizations are still important and
are becoming even more so. About 90% of United States foreign trade
cargo moves by sea, ' and the total annual world food harvast from
the seas is over 50 million metric tons and is expected to reach 400
to 500 million metric tons before acquisition costs become uneco-
nomical.
At the beginning of the second half of this century the
world need for petroleum stimulated the development of techniques
for oil recovery from beneath the bed of the sea, and today the
daily world production of subsea oil ,fhas reached about 5 million
_.
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barrels, about 16 per cent of total world oil recovery, and is
expected to reach one-third of total world oil production within
10 years. The search for oil is moving farther and farther
offshore, and platforms have been constructed to facilitate re*
covery to where such drilling equipment on platforms "can now be
profitably operated in water depths of roughly 600 feet. r Off-
shore petroleum exploratory well depth records have doubled from
640 feet to 1300 feet in just a few years, and within 10 years
actual production should be possible in water four times as deep.
But a new use of the sea as a source of wealth has just begun
to attract world attention, and this is the possibility of extract-
ing needed minerals from the sea by means of water processing,
dredging, drilling and mining. 32 It has been said that:
The hard mineral resources of the shelf and deep
sea have assumed public prominence only recently, unlike
oil and gas, which have been taken from the continental
shelf for more than 30 years. Ocean minerals have been
hailed by some as a nearly inexhaustable treasure trove. 33
The 330 million cubic miles of sea water have been described as
the earth's largest continuing ore body, containing about 50
quadrillion tons of dissolved solids, including 10 billion tons
of gold and nodules rich in manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel
located on the ocean floor, with concentrations of as much as
319Q00 tons of nodules per square mile in some areas of the Paci-
fic Ocean. 3^ rhere are several projects now underway to develop
has
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mora effective means for mining these minerals, as illustrated by
the Deep Sea Drilling roject, an ocean sediment coring program
supported by the national Science Foundation, 3 -> and an interna-
tional consortium of American, Japanese and German firms which are
planning a deep sea dredge to extract manganese nodules off the ocean
floor. 36
Manned Exploration
before economical wealth exploitation may be envision-
ed or achieved, a great deal of oceanic exploratory activity is
required. ? j^ vater environment must first be understood, and
the way to this understanding must come from advances in undersea
science, engineering and equipment. The goal, however, is not
only commercial. Basic oceanic research may hold promise for
knowledge about the earth itself, and exploration is obviously a
key to both commercial exploitation and fundamental science.
As a major step in oceanic exploration it is essential to put man
in the sea, to live and work usefully on the ocean floor for extended
periods of time. But why is man needed at all on the ocean floor,
when modern technology has developed highly effective automation
systems for remote operation? The reason lies in the benefits that
his presence provides: "advantages in his maneuverability, compactness,
agility, and flexibility; in his manipulative skills and dexterity,
visual perception, onsite observation; and chiefly, in his integrative
and dec is ion-making ability."38 In short,
[i m .«!.;.• ©t*/-
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Kan- in- the sea techniques open new doors to the
scientist* With aqualungs and long-duration submerged
laboratories equipped with lockout submersibles he can
make onsite observations of marine ecology, surveys for
geological maps, aquaculture, archeology, studies of
human adaptability and a wide range of specific scienti-
fic investigations in marine biology. 3 ^
The modern deep submersibles, such as Tektite I and II, are
representative of a class of underwater manned habitats which could
very well be precursors to life under the sea for man. The Tektite
project has placed divers on the sea floor for a record-breaking 60
days at epth of 50 feet in 1969. Tektite II, with an estimated cost
ol.l million, involved a manned habitat at 50 feet which was occupied
by a total o? 62 scientists and engineers, rotating in crews of 5 or 6
for ID to 30 cays under the water. ^0 An engineer-aquanaut, who spent
two weeks submerged with the Tektite II, later 3tated in an interview:
"It doesn't take juch imagination to envision underwater communities --
families living and working in self-contained units. "^ The same
"saturation diving" techniques developed in Tektite research have been
used in the Navy's Mark I Deep Dive System, which has allowed salvage
divers to reach successfully a depth of 850 feet.^
These experiments have conclusively established that man can
physically enter water depths beyond the 200 meter, or 600 foot,
depth line which marks the seaward edge of the continental shelf as
defined in the convention on the Continental Shelf. The type





areas is base illustrated by the Aegis, a 70-foo'c portable habitation
consisting of two pressurized sausage-shaped cylinders connected in
the center by a control sphere. The Aegis, which costs almost $1 rail-
lion, has been designed to support 6 scientists for 2 weeks on the ocean
floor without resuppiying and is indeed an underwater home with a
laboratory in one cylinder and living compartments in the other. It
is in such an environment that a crime, such as homicide, may be
hypothesized to occur.
The United Nations as a participant
It is impossible to discuss present and possible future doc-
trines of criminal jurisdiction over the seabed without consider!*.
the current attitudes and legal opinions regarding the seabed expressed
in the United Nations. Jince ultimate resolution of the overall seabed
problem will probably occur within the framework of that international
body, hopefully beginning with the scheduled Conference on the Law of
the Sea in 1973, it is worthwhile to review what has already transpired.
As a result of the urging of various individuals, most notably
Ambassador ardo of Malta in the summer of 1967, the General Assembly,
building on earlier United Nations studies of different aspects of
ocean problems, established by resolution on 18 December 1967 an
Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. The Ad, '.loc





"examination •! tlie question o£ the reservation exclusively for
peaceful purposed sjl the sea-bed and the ocean floor , and the
subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present
national jurisdiction, and the use o£ their resources in the interests
of mankind. ' Hie General Assembly, noting that 'developing technology
is asking the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof,
accessible and exploitable for scientific, economic, military and other
purposes," requested the Ad Hoc Committee to also give an 'indication
regarding practical means of promo tin:, international co-operation in
the exploration, conservation and use" of those areas* The Ad Hoc
Committee completed its consideration of the seabed on 30 August 1968
and submitted a report of its discussions to the General Assembly, but,
claiming a lack of time, the Committee stated that it was unable to
come to final agreement over an acceptable formulation of principles
that would command unanimous support, although the Committee did generally
recognize "the existence of an area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor
underlying the high seas beyond the limits ol national jurisdiction."^
The General Assembly noted the report with appreciation, and,
being convinced that "exploitation should be carried out for the benefit
of mankind as a whole," adopted a second resolution on 21 December 1968
to transform the Ad. Hoc Committee into a permanent Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction in order to continue the study of the seabed in
light of the acknowledged c cy Interests.'6 At the seme time, the
•
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Secretary-General was requested "to undertake a study on the
question of establishing in due time appropriate international
machinery for the promotion of the exploration and exploitation of
the resources of this area."*4 ' In response, the Seabed Committee
conducted discussions and later transmitted a report in 1969 to the
General Assembly, but, like the AU ioc committee, nothing concrete
was achieved: the report was essentially a summary of the views of
the various members and an outline o_ the general problems that would
have to be solved in the future. As the Committee reported,
It was also pointed out that it would be unwise
to send a statement of principle to the General Assam-
bly before the real and legitimate a iterances ol opi-
nion still existing were duly overcome as such a state-
ment should be one which gives satisfaction to all na-
tions. 48
After receiving and reviewing kfcft eaL aittee report,
the General Assembly adopted in December o a third set of
resolutions and expressly aiiirmed that 'there exists an area o the
sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil theraoi which lies beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."4^ in consequence, the Secretary-
General was also requested to seek the views of Member States "on the
desirability of convening at an early date a conference on the law of
sea to review the regimes ox the hi^h seas, the continental shelf,
the territorial sea and contiguous zone ' and at the same time I
Seabed Committee was directed to continue its work.-1 * A final




•controversy. After noting that it was convinced that exploitation
should be "carried out under an international regime, including
appropriate international machinery," the General Assembly unexpect-
edly resolved that, "pending the establishment of the aforementioned
international regime:
fa) States and persons, physical or juridical, are
bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of
the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its re-
sources shall be recognized. "^2
To date, the so-called 'Moratorium Resolution" of lata 1969
represents the last significant pronouncement of the General Assembly
regarding the seabed. Its effect upon States is not now known, of
course, but it certainly indicates that the General Assembly intends
to exert a forceful approach toward the problems of the seabed and to
ensure that the ocean floor does not become a wide-open arena for
fait accompli underwater colonialism.
It is, however, wholly unreasonable to conclude that the
'Moratorium Resolution" was intended to curtail or will have the effect
of curtailing all future activities on the deep seabed and ocean floor.
Not only is the Resolution a nonbinding expression of attitude in the
53form of a recommendation, but the prohibitory words are directed only
to activities of "exploitation of the resources" of deep ocean space.





distinction can and has been made between "exploitation" and
"exploration," the distinction being essentially a difference bet-
ween the "broadly based survey using all available methods generally
of large areas in the first instance, leading by progressively
narrowing the search to the location of mineral occurrences of
possible economic importance" and the "practical and economic
development of minerals based on the appropriate application of
various techniques in order to obtain an economically valuable
product. "-^ In other words, the difference is between looking
and recovering, and it is difficult to construe the Resolution as
barring the looking. As has been seen, technologically advanced
States are fully committed by national olicy decision, manpower
and money to increasing oceanographic research, -* and the Resolu-
tion cannot and should not reverse this desirable impetus to gain
necessary knowledge to advance human understanding of the ocean
environment on which to base a future ocean regime.^® Lastly,
that there is a freedom of ocean research is beyond question, and
although it does not expressly appear in the Convention on the
High Seas the International Law Commission, which draftee the
Convention, commented that:
The list of freedoms o*. the high 3eas contained in
this article is not restrictive. The Commission has
merely specified four of the main freedoms, but it is
aware that there are other freedoms, such as the free-




Thus, whatever consequences the Resolution may have on "exploitation"
activities, it is reasonable to conclude that scientific and oceano-
graphic research will continue to be a permitted use of ocean space
and that attempts to place man on the deep ocean floor for extended
on-site activity will ultimately be successful. Again, in the words




TRADITIONAL CLAIMS TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER CRIME
Jurisdiction
If the present Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea wmA
the recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly are
properly interpreted to permit at least scientific research and
exploration o the seabed, and if present marine technological
achievements can enable the placement of permanent manned research
habitations on the ocean floor beyond a depth of 200 meters, then
jurisdiction over a criminal act, such as murder, which may be
committed there will in all probability be first analyzed in terms
of the traditional claims to exercise jurisdiction over crime, a
distinctly domestic legal approach that will undoubtedly be fol-
lowed until the international community agrees upon a more cooper-
ative attitude toward the problem of extra-territorial crime. A
possibility exists that the proposed Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea in 1973 will consider the question in relation to the
seabed since the United Nations Secretary-General alluded to the
criminal jurisdiction issue in a report to the General Assembly
regarding the establishment of appropriate international machinery
for seabed exploitation.
Building upon these observations, what follows is in the







minal jurisdiction in order to determine whether they satisfactorily
cover seabed crime and to provide a suggested framework for future
discussion at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. Since the Unitec
States is a leading participant in ocean space activity, it is
appropriate to consider at the same time relevant United States law
that bear upon the exercise of United States jurisdiction over crime
on the seabed*
First, the context in which the concept of criminal jurisdic-
tion is used must be defined:
The criminal law has three distinct sections, sub-
stantive, procedural and therapeutic. The substantive
part deals with the types of conduct which organized so-
ciety has forbidden as inimical to its welfare. The
procedural part deals with the apprehension of an alleged
offender and the determination o.C his guilt or innocence.
The therapeutic part deals with the treatment of the of-
fender whose guilt has been determined. The principles
and theories of jurisdiction over criminal offenses form
part of procedural criminal law. 59
Although the "meaning of jurisdiction is far from clear in general
jurisprudence,"" the word may be most accurately thought of for
present purposes as referring to the "competence" of States under
international law to punish and prosecute for crime, rather than
describing the domestic powers, procedures or hierarchies of various
courts or other governmental agencies within States; in short, the
focus here is upon the international capacity as accorded by inter-




Practice shows no uniformity among States in the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction, and the variety of approaches may be trac-
ed in part to differing geographical, political, religious and
historical factors which influenced the development of individual
State legal systems. For example, it is said that one reason
for the emphasis tounc in Aaglo-Americau ountries on the terri-
torial nature of crime, which gives rise to jurisdiction based on
the place of the act, is because of the predominance in those na-
tions ol sea frontiers which hinder the easy movement of people
—
and therefore criminals --across State boundaries; whereas, in
Europe a broader view of jurisdiction is taken because "the Con-
tinent is a network of land or river frontiers, and act or trans-
actions of an international character have been more frequent ow-
ing to the rapidity and facility of movements across the frontiers
63between these countries." Similarly, among Middle East nations
the tendency to look to the nationality of the criminal rather
than to the place of the act may be seen as a result of the reli-
gious tenets of the Moslem faith which viewed a believer as taking
his Koranic laws with him wherever he may travel. *
Whatever the original causes, variations in the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction do exist, although it is now customary to
justify these variations on the basis of State sovereignty and
independence. As stated by the Permanent :ourt of International
Justice, "All that can be required of a State is that it should
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not overstep the limits which international law places upon its
jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise juris-
diction rests upon its sovereignty."' It is, unfortunately, a
difficult matter to determine just what these limits are, which
has led Schwarzenberger to conclude that the "only, but decisive
limitation which . . . international law imposes on sovereign
States is that ... criminal jurisdiction must not actually be
exercised outside the territory, or places assimilated to it, of
the State which claims . . . jurisdiction."'*- Whether or not it
is accurate to say that there are no other limitations, it is cer-
tain that a wide latitude in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
is presently permitted:
International law sets little or no limitation on
the jurisdiction which a particular State may arrogate
to itself. It would appear to follow from the much
discussed Lotus Case (1927), decided by the ermanent
:rt of International Justice, that there is no restric-
ion on the exercise of jurisdiction by any State unless that
restriction can be shown by the most conclusive evidence
to exist as a principle oc international law. In that
case the Permanent Court did not accept the French thesis
--France being one of the parties --that a claim to juris-
diction by a State must be shown to be justified by
international law and practice. In the Court's opinion,
the onus lay on the State claiming that such exercise of
jurisdiction was unjustified, to show that it was pro-
hibited by international law.^
Broadly speaking, the variety of State claims to exercise
jurisdiction may be divided into two general types: personal ju-
risdiction, asserted over indi iduais on grounds of State alle-
giance or protection, and territorial jurisdiction, asserted over
Mn''
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a geographically -iefined portion of the earth which is claimed as
State territory. 73 within these two types, however, may be found
more specific grounds of jurisdiction with their own distinctive
labels
:
An analysis of modern national codes of penal law
and penal procedure, checked against the conclusions of
reliable writers and the resolutions of international
Conferences or learned societies, and supplemented by
some exploration of the jurisprudence of national courts,
discloses five general principles on which a more or less
extensive penal jurisdiction is claimed by States at the
present time. These five general principles are: first,
the territorial principle , determining jurisdiction by
reference to the place where the offense is comraitt
second, the nationality principle, determining jurisdic-
tion by reference to the nationality or national character
of the person committing the offense; third, the protective
principle , determining jurisdiction by reference to the
national interest injured by the offense; fourth, the uni-
versal ity principle , determining jurisdiction by reference
to the custody of the person committing the offense; and
fifth, the passive personality principle , determining
jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national
character of the person injured by the offense. ?4
Recognizing that these traditional principles x/ere formulated
and developed long before man obtained the capability to enter the
previously inaccessible domain of ocean space, the question that
will be immediately presented at the occurrence of a criminal act
on the seabed is whether or not any of these principles may be
interpreted to provide an adequate pidgeonhole for so novel a situ-
ation. Such an attempt to pidgeonhole would certainly be iu keep-
ing with the traditional approach to crime, and one ought to begin
at least with the customary analysis:
•A »*
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The essence of current practice is its mechanical
approach to jurisdiction. A court will ask where the
crime was committed, or what was the nationality of the
criminal or the victim, or whether the security of the
State was threatened. These simple questions will be
used as techanicai jurisdictional tests; the answer to
them will be accepted uncritically. ->
Claims to Jurisdiction Based on
the Deep Seabed as National territory
Because it is a fundamental principle of primary importance
in all legal systems since the feudal era that "A State has
jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed in whole or in
part within its territory, "76 it is appropriate to consider at
the outset whether the territorial principle lias applicability to
the ocean floor. The essential question is, of course, whether a
State may lawfully claim any part of the seabed to be a portion of
its "national territory" and thus extend its competence to punish
crime committed there.
Claims Based on the
Convention on the Continental Shelf
As noted above, the economic prospects of the seabed have
generated considerable controversy in the United Nations about
what might be called the "ownership" *f the ocean floor, and it
might be fairly said that at the present time the answer has not






exclusively to the economic exploitation and the possible establishment
of a comprehensive regime that will allocate authority over the
resources of the seabed, and perhaps govern to come extent the
community uses to which they might be put, the points raised may
be taken as representative of those that might be asserted to justify
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
A view has been advanced which would, through an interpreta-
tion or. the !9o8 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, su
gest that agreement has already been reached with regard to the
potential extension of national territorial sovereignty to the
deep sea arena, so that "as tehnology develops, all the submerged
lands of the world may become parts of the continental shelf by
the very definition of the Convention, ' permitting the interest-
ing inferrence that "all of the submarine areas of the world have
been theoretically divided among the coastal States by this Geneva
78
Convention." Such a conclusion is derived from an apparent am-
biguity in the definition of the legal continental shelf:
For the purposes of these articles, the term "con-
tinental shelf" i3 used as referring a) to the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast
but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth
of 200 meters
,
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admit of the exploitation of




The Convention therefore contains two separate tests which may be
alternatively applied to determine the seaward extent of the legal
continental shelf. The "depth test" fixes the minimum width out
••
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to a point where the coastal water reaches a depth of 200 meters,
and to obtain rights over this area no affirmative act of proclama-
80
tion, occupation or exploitation is required of the coastal State.
But the Convention does not stop at 200 meters. Provision is
also made for the so-called "exploitability test," implying that
the width of the legal shelf may be extended seaward "to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admit of the exploitation of the
natural resources'' as advancements in technology permit access to
the seabed beyond 200 meters. As stated by Young:
If technology makes exploitation activity possible
anywhere in the deep sea, the argument goes, then the
limits of coastal state jurisdiction are automatically
extended under this language of Article 1 up to the
point where Article 6 oC the Convention comes into play
to establish boundaries with other coastal states whose
sovereign rights have been similarly extended. This
literal construction, it is asserted, produces several
desirable effects: it clearly attributes authority and
responsibility to a particular state, establishes a uni-
form seabed regime from the coast outward, reduces
chances of conflict, and promotes the certainty .and
stability necessary to encourage entrepreneurs.
Under this approach, it might be argued that a manned instal-
lation placed on the ocean floor beyond 200 meter of depth by the
United States would permit the United States under the "exploita-
bility test" to exercise territorial "sovereign rights" for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the
shelf, and that criminal activity there would thereby fall within
the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
States" as "lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United
-
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States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction there-
of."** Is such a consequence supportable under either interna-
tional law or policy?
It is submitted that the meaning and effect of the "expioita-
bility test" is undertain, and that to hinge criminal jurisdiction
on such a complicated and unrelated problem would be to need less ly
tie in the objectives of the criminal law, over which most nations
generally agree, with the much more disputed political and econo-
mic objectives sought in the entire arena of ocean space, over
which few nations presently agree. Fortunately, it is no purpose
of this discussion to decide the meaning of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf; the thrust is only to demonstrate the inherent
difficulty of trying to claim any part of the seabed as "territory,"
at least for the purposes of the criminal law.
Three basic problems may be noted. First, how far seaward
may the Convention extend State sovereign rights? It cannot be
accepted that the "objective of the Convention on the Continental
Shelf was to divide the beds of the seas among coastal nations,"*"
since it is unreasonable to define the continental shelf, which is
a geologic concept referring to the underwater extension of the
sloping continental land mass, as including all of the ocean bot-
tom. By its very title the Convention on the Continental Shelf








apparent that the framers were primarily concerned only with the
shelf:
The Commission has not made specific mention of
the freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the
high seas. It considered that apart from the case of
the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil
of a continental shelf . . . such exploitation had not
yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify
special regulation. 84
Also, the Convention speaks of submarine lands "adjacent to the
coast, " and "adjacent" can hardly be interpreted as reaching to
the mid-ocean, °'-> an interpretation which could eventually lead to
the appropriation of all submerged lands by coastal States and a
new era of underwater colonialism. 1 ^ Furthermore, it is unlike-
ly that State pretensions much beyond 200 meters of depth would
be accepted by the international community, which has agreed at
the very minimum that "there exists an area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof which lies beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. ' In short, the better view is that
of Burke:
It seems difficult to establish that the Shel con-
vention sets out any explicit limit on the shelf even
though there was undoubtedly an intent to indicate there
was a limit on coastal expansion. What the Geneva Con-
ference apparently sought to do was to achieve both some
certainty (hence the 200-meter limit) plus sufficient
flexibility to take into account unpredictable technolo-
gical and economic progress (hence the exploitability
criterion in the alternative). It was very clear that
the conferees in Geneva did not believe they had disposed
of the entire ocean floor, i.e., they were aware there was
a limit but did not seek to establish what it might be in
advance of the social-political-economic-technological
'.
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context which would call for and permit more precise de-
dcion. In the meautiaie the 1- as to move on
as exploitation moved outward, to the limit of adjacency,
until the Convention could be revised. 88
£ven II it can be concluded that the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf does not extend potentially to mid-ocean but is
limited to some unknown point of "adjacency," a second basic prob-
lem still exists. By what standards does the exploitability teat
entitle a State to claim submarine areas beyond 200 meters? One
criterion might be a "relative" standard, which would accord
Convention rights only to the State asserting such claims by vir-
tue of its own technological capabilities. In the other words,
a State claiming "sovereign rights'' over the shell: aiust demonstrate
that it has the ability and skills to conduct the exploitation. A
contrasting criterion is the 'absolute" standard, which would per-
mit all coastal States to assert continental shelf claims based
upon the skills of the world's most advanced State, whether or
not the asserting State itself has the capability to commence ex-
ploitation. Furthermore, with either standard, does the exploita-
bility test require actual exploitation in process, or does it
refer to the potential of exploitation if existing resources, tech-
90
no logy and equipment were brought to bear?
The third problem with the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, assuming either actual or potential exploitation, is the
unanswered question as to whether the exploitation giving rise to
••".'
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extended shelf rights must be economical in light of the return,
or merely that it is possible to extract resources regardless of
91
the cost. This, of course, raises the same issue in another
way: what is meant by "exploitation" within the provisions of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf?
It must be acknowledged that there is a grey area in the con-
tinental shelf doctrine caused by the inclusion of the ambiguous
criterion of exploitabiiity, and that Liganuous arguments may be
theoretically constructed to imply tliat the legal shelf may extend
some distance beyond 2^0 meters. It is not likely, however, that
the United States as a practical matter would seek to assert its
territorial criminal jurisdiction based on the "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction" much beyond that depth. Constitu-
tional due process issues aside, "^ such an assertion would be in-
consistent with present United States policies regarding the sea-
bed. On 23 May 1970, President Nixon issued a statement which
represents the American attitude toward the seabed:
I am today proposing that all nations adopt as soon
as possible a treaty under which they would renounce all
national claims over the natural resources of the seabed
beyond the point -where the high seas reach a depth of
200 meters (218. 8 yards) and would agree to regard these
resources as the common heritage of mankind. 93
The conclusion that must be drawn is that the Convention on
Continental Shelf gives no support for the extension of doctrinaa
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of criminal jurisdiction based on territoriality to seabed crime,
and chat the possibility of territorial acquisition of the ocean
floor must be found, if it is to be found at all, in another ap-
proach.
Claims Based on Territorial Acquisition
Historically, before the seabed became accessible, the earth
was generally thought to be legally divided into the land mass
consisting o^ State territory and terra uullius (land belonging
to no one and subject to being acquired by a State), and the high
seas, which were considered to be res omnium communis belonging
to ail nations and not subject to being acquired by any State).
^
3 door to the seabed now having been opened by technology, the
question has been presented as to whether the seabed is terra nul-
lius , res omnium communis , or neither. Recognizing that there is
no particular magic in either of those legal labels, the essential
issue is, simply, whether the seabed beyond the coverage of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf is legally capable of beiug
acquired by a State. In other words, are the traditional modes
of territorial acquisition applicable today to the ocean floor or
subsoil? If they are, it would logically follow that the acquir-
ing State would be competent to exercise its territorial criminal
jurisdiction over any areas so acquired.








law the high seas cannot be acquired by a State, but writers
are not agreed about the status of the land beneath the surface
of the high seas. Most discussions have centered about the con-
tinental shel- doctrine first asserted by President Truman in
1945 in which the United States successfully claimed control over
the shelf, but that claim is no real precedent since it was not
founded on any theory of res nuliius ; the doctrine stands oni.,
for the proposition, accepted later in the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf, that a coastal State has as a matter of reasonable
right the competence to exercise exclusive control over its off-
shore resources.-'" But that limited doctrine aside, the comments
of some writers are broad enough to support the suggestion that
any part of the ocean floor is subject to acquisition on the theo-
ries that the freedom of the high seas was to protect navigation
and that navigation would not be jeopardised by State claims to
the ocean floor, 97 and that if the seabed cannot be acquired it
cannot be effectively utilized by anyone. "°
However, even if it can be assumed that the seabed may be
legally acquired, that is not the whole of the difficulty:
Once we abandon the res omnium communis approach
and accept the idea that the shelf is capable of being
acquired by a state, we are then faced with the prob-
lem of determining how this acquisition can legitimate-
ly be accomplished. Those who viewed the seabed and
its subsoil as terra nuliius , that is, like land terri-
tory without a master, turned to recognized modes of




If the seabed is indeed res mil litis or otherwise legally capable
of acquisition, then it must be acquired through occupation,
which is an original mode of acquisition by which a State intentionally
appropriates territory not under the sovereignty of another ftate
and does not, like prescription, depend on long-continued and un-
interrupted lictu The criterion is not the passage of
time nor the ccquieser.ee of other States: "The main legal problem
with re-ard to occupation lias been to define the degree and kind of
possession effective to create a title and to define the area o
territory to which such possession might be said from time to time
apply. "*«* The manner in which occupation takes places has been
described by Oppenheim-Lauterpacht:
lory and practice agree nowadays upon the rule
that occupation ic ted through taking possession
and establishing an administration over, territory in the
name of, and for, the acquiring State. Occupation thus
effected is real occupation, and, in contradistinction to
fictitious occupation, is named effective occupation.
-ess ion and administration are the two essential facts
that constitute an effective occupation. *02
To apply this concept to the submarine floor is obviously a diffi-
cult task, but the answer i3 attempted in the following comment:
It must now suffice to say th&t, after the Island
of Palmas, Eastern Greenland tad Jlipperton Island cases,
it seems impossible to maintain that actual settlement
or exploitation is a sine qua non of effective occupation.
Occupation, in the modern law is the assumption of sover-
eignty rather than the appropriation of property and
these three ca363 lay down clearly that what is required
is effective cispiay of state activity in such a manner
as the circumstances of the territory demand. No doubt,
an international tribunal will still seek to distinguish
li
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between a genuine, effective manisifestion of state func-
tions and a purely paper claim but in desolate, or, in
the case of the sea-bed, submerged territory, it will
only demand the minimum state activity which the nature
of the territory calls for. On this basis, effective
ion o" jurisdiction over "airly extensive areas
of the sea-bed can probably be established without ne-
cessarily showing much or even any physical activity on
the seabed itself. 103
It is difficult to understand how the acquisition of terri-
tory on the seabed can be easily reconciled with the idea that
the seas are free for the use of all mankind. Navigation, for
example, cannot help but be affected, especially by surface sup-
port equipment that may be require'1 above the submarine site. ^04
Furthermore, the wtigM of the 1 authority viewing the sea-
bed as res
_ has been seriously lessened by recent develop-
ments in the United Nations, which would seem to flatly reject
any national acquisition of the seabed. As noted by the Legal
Working Group of the Ad_ Hoc Committee
:
I .erence was made to the concepts of res nullius
and res communis . 3ome members considered that the con-
cept of res communis might be applicable. Other members
expressed the view that neither concept would be helpful
in the present context. The view was emphasized that
the sea-b ocean floor beyond the limits of present
national jurisdiction should be regarded as having special
legal status as the common heritage of mankind. With
respect to non-appropriation, it was noted that a number
o historic examples of occupation put forward by various
writers must be regarded as very special and exceptional
cases.
In essence, the "attempt to reconcile the modern view of title by








points out the difficulty inherence in applying concepts created
to handle land area problems to the bed of the sea."*06
Claims to Jurisdiction Based on Nationality
If the traditional principle of jurisdiction based on terri-
toriality is inapplicable to the deep sea arena for the reasons
that territorial claims are precluded by both law and policy from
being asserted over that area, one may turn for possible solution
to the second traditional principle of jurisdiction, which is
based on the nationality of the criminal. Although the terri-
torial principle has become the primary ground of jurisdiction in
modern law, it is a relatively recent development and was preceded
by the older nationality principle, which was based upon "the
relationship between the State and its citizens, rather than the
locus delicti or the place of the impact": '
The history of ail laws opens with an entirely
persona L conception of law: every man possessed only
the rights and duties with which the laws of his own
tribe, city, or class invested him, and could not be
judged by any other. The expansion of the Umpire of
Rome to the limits of the known world robbed this Idea
of all practical importance rather than destroyed it.
It revived in full force in the Middle Age3, when
feudalism subjected every man to the jurisdiction of
the lord to whom he owed allegiance in return for the
protection to which he was entitled. Jurisdiction
was then founded upon allegiance. 1^8
he nationality principle, however, has not been superceded
by the territorial doctrine, although it is considered to be of
I
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secondary importance. The principle hag been formulated by the
Harvard Dl jde as follows
:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime
committee' outside its territory,
By a natural person who was a national of
that State when the eriat was committed or who is a na-
tional of that State when prosecuted or punished; or
(b) By a corporation or other juristic person
which had the national character of that State when the
crime was committed. 1^9
2 reasons underlying such jurisdiction today have been sum-
marized a3 follows:
Jurists have advanced an interesting variety o' rea-
sons for the State's control over its nationals. It has
been M that since the State is composed of nation-
als, who are its members, the State's law should apply to
them wherever they may be; (2) that the State is primari-
ly interested in and affected by the conduct of its na-
tionals
, (3) that penal laws are of a personal character,
like those governing civil status, and that, while only
reasons d* prore public justify their application to aliens
within the territory, they apply normally to nationals of
the State everywhere; (4) that the protection of nationals
abroad gives rise to a reciprocal duty of obedience; (5)
that any offence committed by a national abroad causes a
disturbance of the social and moral order in the State of
his allegiance; (6) that the national knows best his own
State's penal law, that he is more likely to be fairly and
effectively tried under his own State's law and by his own
State courts, and that the most appropriate jurisdiction
from the point of view ol the accused should be considered
rather than a jurisdiction determined by reference to the
offence; (7) that without the exercise of such jurisdiction
many crimes would go unpunished, especially where States
refuse to extradite their nationals* H®
If a crime such as murder is committed in an underwater in-
stallation which cannot be legally described as a ship or vessel, l
international law accords jurisdictional competence to the State
of which the murderer is a national. But not all states exer-
•
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cise jurisdiction over their nationals with regard to all extra-
territorial acts. The situation that may be presented is illus-
trated by United States law.
Under the United States system, the main burden of the cri-
minal law falls upon the individual states, but state law does not
reach to the high seas beyond territorial limits. The possible
applicability of United states criminal law to the seabed must
therefore be found in federal statutes.*-^ And since there is
no federal statute addressed specifically to the deep seabed, the
answer must be found in some broader statute which may be construec
to extend to American nationals outside the territorial limits of
the United States. Statutes expressly applicable to the "terri-
tory" of the United States cannot be considered to embrace the
deep seabed, since, as has been seen, *"* the United States has
clearly rejected any territorial claim to the seabed and would
hardly bring such a claim through the backdoor approach of assert-
ing criminal jurisdiction based on its territorial laws.
One group of Americans, however, are clearly under United
States jurisdiction when on the seabed. By virtue of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, *^ "all members of a regular component
of the armed force3"H5 are subject to that comprehensive code of
criminal law, and the Code "applies in all places. "^-^ Although
special problems might arise in the execution of such military






operated by a foreign State, ' the Code is sufficient to control
criminal conduct by military personnel in the seabed area.
The position of American civilians is far less clear. Al-
though the Uniform Code of Military Justice is by its terms appli-
cable to "persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the
armed forces outside the United States, "H® it is doubtful that
such a provision can be relied upon to reach the particular situ-
ation of the seabed. Court decisions regarding that portion of
the Code have all but been declared constitutionally inapplicable
to civilians in peacetime.*-^ It can also be argued that the
military agencies are involved primarily with scientific explora-
tion of the seabed in an advowed non-military capacity, and it
might therefore be difficult to view participating civilians as
"serving with, employed by or accompanying the armed forces,"
Indeed, the relationship may well be the other way around.
The limited federal criminal code which is based on the 'spe-
cial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"
is not restricted only to "lands reserved or acquired for the use
of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent juris-
diction thereof," but also includes the 'high seas" and "any other
waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Uni-
1 ?
"
ted States." Is the seabed "high seas" within the meaning of
that special jurisdiction?
It has been theorized by one writer that floating Antarctic
pack ice would probably be considered as "high seas" because its
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"physical state Is temporary and it occupies areas normally part
of the high seas,"*2 '- and the prosecution of an American techni-
cian for homicide on a floating Arctic ice island appears to be
based on that analysis.*22 ^re is a physical difference bet-
ween a separate piece of frozen sea and the expanse of solid soil
beneath the sea, just as there is a difference between the seabed
and the airspace above the high seas. But even though seabed,
ice and airspace are vertical aspects of the same spatial area, a
federal court declined to interpret "high seas" to include air-
space over the sea in the prosecution of an assault in an over-
flying aircraft, reasoning in part that the special jurisdiction
refers to offenses "upon" the high oeas and "upon" does not mean
"over." 1 Some of the decision's value has been subsequently
weakened by a revision of the wording defining special jurisdic-
tion, and because the word "upon" was deleted one commentator
found support in the conclusion that:
The phrase used is unrestricted in any way. It
doesn't say "on the surface of the water," or "under the
surface of the ocean" or "air-space over the surface of
the water." All these and even the soil beneath the
ocean floor are within its scope, down to the center of
the earth. 12^
Although it might be possible to interpret the special juris-
diction" over the "high seas" to reach seabed crime committed by
American civilian nationals, such an interpretation would certain-
ly have to be strained in order to reach a result not legislatively
n '.'
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contemplated. The extension of jurisdiction over the seabed
is undeniably a desirable result, but it would be better for the
sake of future certainty to attack the problem squarely and unam-
biguously. Furthermore, the extensioa o jurisdiction based on
nationality of the criminal would obviously cover only nationals
of the State asserting jurisdiction, leaving a gap with regard to
foreign nationals who may be visiting or working in an underwater
installation belonging to another State.
Claims Baaed on the Principle of Universality
Under the principle of universality, which allocates juris-
diction on the basis of the custody of the criminal, may be found
the traditional prescriptions relating, to international piracy. ^25
Piracy was developed historically to provide for the necessary
protection of maritime commerce in the 17th and 18th Centuries,
permitting any State to seize and punish any person for acts of
violence committed on the high seas outside the territorial limits
of any State. ^6 phe major outlines of the modern law of piracy
nay be briefly stated as follows: International piracy is any
act of violence or depredation committed for private ends outside
the jurisdiction of any State by a private ship externally against
another ship or property, or persons therein; a pirate may be
seized by any State outside the jurisdiction of any other State
by means of any properly authorized public ship and tried in
.
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accordance with the seizing State's municipal laws of punishment
and procedure. *-! The customary law o; piracy has been recent-
ly codified and appears in the 1956 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas:
piracy consists of any of the following acts:
i> Any illegal acts of violence, detention
or any act of depredation, committed for private ends
by the crew or the km of a private ship or a
private aircraft, and directed:
a) On the hinh seas, against another
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or
property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State. I2fi
It would at first seem that piracy, developed to control
crime in an area not under the jurisdiction of any State, would
have a direct applicability to the analogous area of the seabed
since the objectives are to some extent the same. But upon
closer scrutiny, the concept of piracy as it is now formulated
may be of questionable utility with respect to seabed crime.
First, piracy does not reach all serious crimes. A piratical
act has been characterized by the convention as one which involve*
some undefined element of violence, and while this would certainly
include murder, it would at the sane time exclude crimes of
stealth, such as theft. ^^ In consequence, international piracy
would permit the extension of only a partial criminal regime over
the seabed, leaving jurisdiction over other crimes completely un-
resolved. There has even been a suggestion that the Convention
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is inconsistent with customary law by defining piracy to mean
"any illegal acts of violence, 1 ' in that piracy has traditionally
been concerned with criminal conduct that menaces the interna-
tional community generally and not just the interests of one par-
ticular state, which raises the broac question of whether a
criminal act committed in an isolates seabed installation operated
by one State is a sufficient threat | inclusive world inter-
ests as a whole in the seabed. ,he Convention, it should be
noted, does not cover acts of violence wholly internal to one
ship since it requires the criminal conduct to flow externally from
one ship to another ship, persons or property, leaving internal acts
to the jurisdiction of the flag otate, L - lending support to the
interpretation that the Convention is more appropriately concerned
with widespread violence.
A second problem with the convention is that it speaks of
"ships" as the instrumentalities irom which piratical acts are
to originate. It would be most _cult to call a fixed, non-
navigable installation built upon the ocean floor a "ship," and
the conclusion that the Convention was specifically addressed to
ships as couuonly understood is rein^or^ the additional words
that piracy is committed by the "crew or passengers" of a ship.
Neither word comfortably describes the status of underwater
scientists or engineers occupyiu , au immobile installation. Since





cotisaitted on the high seas, and since the Convention provides in
the alternative for ship versus "persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State,' 1 thus eliminating the
recipient ship requirement for that area, does the elimination lead to
a different result? The drafters were apparently not even thinking
of the seabed in that context:
In considering as "piracy 1 ' acts committed outside
the jurisdiction of any State, the jommisslon had chic
ly in mind acts committed by a ship or aircraft on an
island constituting terra nullius or on the shores of
an unoccupied territory. l^z
Since an underwater installation is not an "island, "*-33 and be-
cause the Coumission cannot be understood to mean that the sea-
bed is res nullius, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the
Jonvention definition of piracy is not by its terras applicable to
seabed installations.
Even if a legal analysis could somehow justify seabed crime
as coming under the strict provisions of modern international pi-
racy, there are practical reasons deriving from the emotional im-
pact of the word 'piracy" that would disincline a State to base
jurisdiction over the seabed by asserting piracy doctrines. It
does not take much insight to discover that the words "pirate"
and "piracy" have been used in the last fifty years to describe
activities considerably removed from those that were historical-
ly viewed, popularly and legally, as piratical. For example,




submarine attacks during the First World War 1 -* 5 and the Spanish
Civil War, (2) the hijacking of rumrunners during the Prohibition
Era, 137 (3) the seizure of Polish ships by the Nationalist Chinese
in the South China Sea in the early 1950's, 138 (4) the unlicensed
radio broadcasting from offshore England ,139 (5) the reproduction
of copywriter' materials without payment of royalties, 1 ^ (6) the
temporarily successful internal overthrow in 1961 of a passenger
liner by a group of self-declared revolutionaries, 1^ 1 (7) the
many recent hijackings of commercial aircraft, 1^ (8) the un-
authorised use of foreign territorial waters for fishing, 1^*
(9) the partial justification for the trial of Adolph Eichmann by
the Israeli Government , !44 ancj -he claimed grounds for the
threatened trials of American pilots captured by North Vietnam. 5
These extensions of the pirate label to such a diverse assortment of
conduct contain at least one common thread: it is the desire to
portray, without further analysis, certain activities as somehow--
but indisputably—against the deeper fundamental interests of the
international community of nations, bringing to the popular mind
the picture of an enemy of all of mankind, a perpetrator of extreme
lawlessness. The persuasive appeal of such a striking metaphorical
invective is not hard to understand, but apart from some 'transient
political objective" 1^ to be achieved in an international exchange
of invectives, it does not 3eem that in the future a seabed criminal
would warrant such an aggravated label as 'pirate," which would
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entitle any nation to intervene in a submarine installation
belonging to a foreign nation for the purpose of his capture and
trial. For these reasons it can be expected that a State, such as
the United states, would intentionally refrain from extending
piracy doctrines to the seabed floor, especially when a less
volatile basis of jurisdiction may be applicable.
Claims leased ou Uio rinciples o_
l a a s 1ve i/ers ona 1 i l^ .- j Lection
Nationality of the Victim
A fourth traditional principle tion is that of
"passive personality ! or ive nationality :t and is based on
the nationality of the vict.; foal act rather than the
nationality of the criminal. 1 ' ^ fhe principle is said to arise
out of the obligation of a :->tate to protect its citizens abroad, l*i
and jurisdiction fouudec upon it Lftftdfl to the consequence that
the State may execute its criminal laws against an alien for an
extraterritorial act commiti. ;t one of its nationals.
The principle received its most famous airing before the eat
Court of International Justice in , in which Turkish
law was asaertec which provided that Any foreigner who . . . com-
mits an offense abroacl to the prejudice of . . . ;ish subject
. . . shall be punished in accordance with the Turkish Penal Code
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provided he is arrested in Turkey. It was held that Turkey
was internationally competent to punish the French master (sub-
sequently arrested in Turkey) of a French ship who through negli-
gence caused a collision with a Turkish ship which led to the loss
of Turkish lives. The holding of the court may be interpreted to
uphold the jurisdiction on the ground that the master's negligence
produced its effects on a ship assimilated to Turkish territory,
but there is dictum stating that States are not obligated to ad-
here only to tie territorial princi; Although the passive
personality principle, strictly speaking, was neither approved nor
rejected, Lotus has been read f l a broader authority:
In other words, the c. slat ion of a
sovereign State is not bound to keep within the limits
of territorial an .It may at-
tempt to cover acts of foreign nationals which have
been committed abroad. 151
But even though the passive personality principle is recog-
nized in various lorms and degrees by many countries, "2 j t £S
strongly condemned by writers who properly point out that such a
claim is an unnecessary intrusion into the primarily domestic com-
petence of a foreign State which cannot be justified on the
grounds o the remote effect upon the social order o r the victim
State, especially where no real effect is produced within the
latter' 3 boundaries: "The interests of the forum state fade into
insignificance where the conduct abroad has no connection with
the life of the state itself but only with the personal interests
I
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of one of its nationals. 1 '* 1,3 The potential victim who ventures
abroad can more effectively and reasonably rely upon protection
under appropriate foreign laws an.' forums. 154 uut. perhaps the
more fundamental problem is the complete lack of rtandards in the
content of the passive personality principle: over what crimes,
and by what advance notice to potential wrongdoers, can a State
hold accountable a foreigner for acta conmitted in a foreign ter-
ritory? In short, 'The absence of a definite standard to deter-
mine whether a State may act on behalf of its citizen or treat
wrong done to Ma abroad as a crir thus cause as much individual
injustice as the lack of a consistent criterion to determine juris-
diction over extraterritorial wrongs done by nationals."*-^
For these reasons, the United States has never admitted the
propriety of the principle, *56 and "although it is not unheard of
in international law to assert criminal jurisdiction on the basis
of the nationality of the victim, it has not been the view of Ameri-
can lawyers in the past that this is a sufficient ground. "*57 In
the words o the harvard Research:
Jurisdiction asserted upon the principle of passive
personality without qualifications has been more strongly
contested than any other type of competence. It has
been vigorously opposed in An arican countries . .
. It has had distinguished opponents ant itinental
writers ... Of all principles of jurisdiction havir.
some substantial support in contemporary national legis-
lation, it is the most difficult to justify in theory.
Unless circumscribed by importan uards and limita-
tions, it is unlikely that it can be made acceptable to
an important group of States ... In consequence, the




The fIftil traditional principle of jurisdiction is in concept
analogous to passive personality, 1 ' except that the object of pro-
tection is not a particular person but rather the tate as a whole,
the justification being that "since criminal law exists to protect
the State, it must be extended as far as necessary for such protec-
tion," 159 It is not all State criminal laws that are extended
extraterritorialiy, but only those that touch upon the more funda-
mental interests of the State as an entity, such as its security,
territorial integrity, political independence, and, perhaps, its
economic institutions and regulatio irvard Draft
Code has this formulation:
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime
committed outside its territory by an alien against the
security, territorial integrity or political independence
#f that "tate, provider that the act or omission which
constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise
a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place
where it was committed.
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime
committed outside its territory by an alien which con-
sists of a falsification or counter -let inf., or an utter-
ing Is if led copies or counterfeits, of the seals,
currency, instruments o credit, stamps, passports, or
public documents, issues by that State or under its
authority. 161
The peneral thrust o r these protective laws has been descri-
bed as follows
:
a rational grounds for the exercise of this juris-
diction are two-fold :-- (i) the offenses subject to the





their consequences may be of the utmost gravity and con-
cern to the State against which they are directed; (ii)
unless jurisdiction then were s::srcised, many such offen-
ses would escape punishment altogether because they did
not contravene the lav? plaee where they were com-
mitted (lex loci delicti N . . . . 2
There are certain United States federal statutes that "all
under the class of protective laws as so defined and expressly
provide for jurisdiction over acts committed abroad. These are,
however, in the nature o tr tad against the
fovernnent, counterfeiting, perjury, and draft and income tax
evasion,*"3 and obviously would have little practical importance
to the seabed and the types of cri- c that would likely occur
there. Furthermore, the protective principle is viewed with no
little !•giving by writers, and it has been said that "the pre-
vailing tendency is to extend the principle in an arbitrary and
apparently bound len ion,"1 *** and
protective principle, since it is not restrict-
ed witl tively determined limits, exemplifies the
evils resultin an unrer- trained exercise of sover-
his
is not to suggest that a Ctate may not protect its own
JLntfl act the purpose of the pro-
tective principle is essential to the continued exist-
ence of .'tates, but arbitr l3e of criminal juris-
diction results in the violation of that same integrity.'
If present federal protective statut not reach the sea-
bed situation, it would seem unwise and unjustifiable to create
protective laws for that purpose :he establishment and
operation of an underwater research installation does not present
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such a fundamental threat to the basic interests of the State as
to claim that a criminal act committed there must be, for the




RESOLVING JURISDICTION OVER SEABED CRIME
It should be apparent from the preceding review of the five
traditional principles of Jurisdiction that they, mechanically
applied, do not easily nor comprehensively encompass those acts
of crime which might be anticipated to occur in so novel an en-
vironment as the ocean floor. Such a conclusion is liardly sur-
prising, since the traditional doctrines relating to criminal
jurisdiction and State competence originated and developed many
years ago to cope with socially impermissible conduct committed
on land during a period when State sovereignty concepts charac-
terized all relationships and dealings between States. But
future crime on the seabed, should it occur, will take place in
an entirely different context, physically and internationally.
It will not be committed within readily identifiable territorial
frontiers under the exclusive authority of a particular State,
but will take place instead in an international arena where all
States have a direct and legitimate interest in the regulation
of criminal activity as it might bear upon their equal rights to
reasonable access and use. Like many modern crimes, the ease
of communication and travel across the globe permits the partici-
pants in a criminal act, whether r.s offender or victim, to be of
more than one nationality and therefore have ties to more than one
State, and this possibility is particularly relevant to the deep




foreign scientists and technicians. No longer can all crimes be
adequately described as failing solely within the domestic juris-
diction of a particular State, and there is now a growing recogni-
tion that for some matters and objectives there is an interdependence
of States in the accomplishment of a common purpose. One would
think that the suppression of crime, wherever it may occur, would
be such a common purpose as to elicit the enlightened cooperation
of all States, but the traditional principles of jurisdiction are
obviously not founded upon that objective. It should not then be
acceptable today to apply the old solutions in their artificial and
technical way to reach new problems, at least if the common purpose
is to be served. It is time, particularly with re^ar to the
emerging uses of ocean space, to look realistically at criminal
conduct involving international elements in light of the objectives
to be achieved, and then an appropriate jurisdictional approach should
be fashioned and accepted that will clearly, effectively and com-
prehensively accomplish those objectives.
Minimum Objectives in Ocean Space
Until such time as the international community can negotiate
a viable multilateral agreement over the many aspects of State
and private activities in ocean space, including the question of
jurisdiction, one of the primary interim objectives is to ensure
the orderly and peaceful use of the seas, whether in the course
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of research, exploration or exploitation. In its broadest sense,
the objective is to establish and encourage respect for a system
of world order that seeks at least to control the exercise of
private violence as a permissible instrument between individuals
and at the same time allocate clear authority for the protection
of individuals from interference by others. ^6 jjie ta8k £ ragu.
lating socially harmful conduct obviously falls on the criminal
law, which functions "to protect organized society, the individuals
who compose it, and the institutions which have been created for
their organization and control. ,167 But the traditionally tech-
nical nature of criminal jurisdiction, with its emphasis on the
mechanical identification of territory and nationality, has result-
ed in no real certainty in the accomplishment of this function, and
hence the objective of minimum public order is not adequately
furthered. Situations may develop on the seabed where the mem-
bers of one installation are not under one set of criminal pre-
scriptions, or perhaps, as a practical matter, under no prescrip-
tions at all. What is required is a reasonable adjustment and
accommodation of inclusive and exclusive national interests with
the practicalities of exercising authority over the seabed, and
it is suggested that an interim solution may be possible with
slight modification to existing doctrine. The result would be a
clear allocation of exclusive criminal authority over all members





of a more or less comprehensive criminal code to all activities
taking place within the installation.
The Ship Analogy
Even though the doctrine of the freedom or the seas ensured
that the seas won! in open to all nations on an equal basis,
the doctrine "has never warranted a state of unregulated lawless-
ness on the high seas,"1^ for, as maritime commerce was stimula-
ted by new markets and new navirational advancements, the very
real need arose to subject the increasing number of ships on the
oceans to some sort of protection and authority. Even though
States primarily observed at that tio.e the territorial principle
of jurisdiction, an exception was carved out by necessity and States
were permittee' the competence to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
their own ships when on the high seas.'-"' I legal justification
was presented by use of the fiction that a ship was likened to a
"floating island" belonging, as territory, to the State whose
national flag she flew. In such a way, tl regime was extended
to each ship plying the oceans o! the earth, and this customary law
is now codified in the Convention on the High 7 eas.
Ships shall sail under the li DM tate only
and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for
in international treaties or in these articles, shall




Since the initial manned exploration of the ocean floor will
be conducted by a specially-designed submersible ship, the flag
jtate jurisdiction principle will be sufficient to support the
exercise of whatever authority is necessary to control crime aboard
the vessel, and the result would be the same under United States
law which defines the 'special maritime and territorial juris-
diction" to include Many vessel belonging in whole or in part to
the United States or any citizen thereof ****'* gut the uge f
such ships is seen as only the first step to the establishment on
the ocean floor of more or less permanent installations. Gan these
fixed structures be legally called and treated as ''ships"?
There is no international definition of what constitutes a
ship, and the Convention on the High Seas provides merely that
"Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for
the right to Cly its flag."* 72 The word "ship" is undefined, leaving
the question to the individual States. Nevertheless, as the word
is understood, the element that a ohip is something that is capable
of maritime navigation is common to all international definitions
of a ship: ''A movable chattel which is not suited for maritime
navigation is not a sea-join "h most leral systems
are agreed ."A/J ^he United - on is similar, for although
the word "vessel" is undefined under the "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction," the federal statute regulating shipp
and the registration of ships provides:
'-'
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The terra "vessel" Includes all water craft and
other artificial contrivances of whatever description
and at whatever stage of construction, whether on the
stocks or launched, which are used or are capable of
being or are intended to be used as a means of trans-
portation on water. 174
If a fixed submarine installation on the ocean floor is not
properly considered to be a ship because it cannot be used in
maritime transportation or navigation, it does not mean that
ship-like rules of jurisdiction may not offer some worthwhile
analogy to an underwater habitat. Obviously, such an installa-
tion cannot be looked at as a "floating iolanu, *'5 nor can
jurisdiction over the seabed be grounds*! on territorial claims,
as the word 'island'' would suggest, iiodern analysis has at any
rate rejectee, the floating Is U oncept and has justified
flag State authority over shi[ on the basis of the
national relationship between a State and its ship and on the
"need of the unified prescription aud application of authority
for the maintenance of public order. '176 gv this reasoning, it
is not the maritime nature of the instrumentality that justifies
the authority of the State, but rather the need for some authority
to fill what might otherwise be a vacuum:
The legal institutions called nationality of ships,
nationality of airplanes, and nationality of space craft
have in common that they serve primarily to ensure public
order in international space (the high seas, regions in
the Antarctic, the air above the high seas and the said
regions, the space above the air). As long as there is
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no international authority to ensure that, in interna-
tional space, the law is observed by those traversing it,
states will have to perform this task.*??
The same reasoning applies with equal persuasiveness to the
international space of the deep seabed. Except for the navi
v
bility factor, there is an essential functional similarity between
a ship and an underwater installation with regard to the circum-
stances requiring the allocation of definite State jurisdiction
over both •£ the types of instrumentalities. They are both relatively
small self-contained units that may operate outside of all State
territorial limits and they both have a close connection with the
State responsible for their operation, whose interests may be
jeopardized by unlawful conduct aboard the units. The ship analogy,
furthermore, has also been applied to research stations in Anarctica
and space craft in outer space for the same basic reasons. With
regard to the Antarctic situation, it has been said:
Fmt as in the case o^ vessel on the high seas,
the fortunes of ail personnel . . . are bound together
in a common enterprise controlled by the state sponsor-
ing the expedition; the station or party is present ia
a vast area over which no state has recognized sever-
ity; control of conduct is highly important; and
only the state sponsoring the expedition may be in a
practical position to control this conduct and appre-
hend and punish offenders. In such situations, the
reasonableness of permitting the state maintaining the
enterprise to control the conduct of all engaged in it
seems apparent. ^^
A similar attitude can be ceen in the following prediction,





This alleged metaphor of a craft as a floating or
flying bit of the territory of the state of its nation-
ality will, in the case of spacecraft on voyages of lo
duration, come even closer to reality. For protecting
their unique interests in the spacecraft and its crew,
and for ensuring the well-being of passengers, irres-
pective of their nationality, states will probably,
therefor, claim exclusive competence to prescribe
policies for establishing discipline on beard and pre-
venting disorders endangering these unique interests. 1
If it is desirable and justifiable to draw an analogy between
a fixed submarine habitation and a ship on the high seas in order
to support "tate competence to exercise necessary criminal juris-
diction, it might be accomplished by an artificial interpretation
of present laws referring to ships, or it might be accomplished by
an express provision defining underwater installations to be "ships"
for the purposes of, for example, the Convention on the Sigh Seas
and the United states "special uaritime and territorial jurisdiction."
But these approaches would use or compound fictions, and it is
suggested that the better approach would be to treat the issue
squarely in order to reach a reasonable and legitimate result. It
is therefore recommended for the reasons set forth above that the
Convention on the '.Ugh Seas be amended to include the following
arti le:
All manned installations or structures placed or
erected upoa or near the ocean :loor underlying the high
seas beyond the limits of State sovereignty shall be
registered under the laws oL one State only and shall be
subject to Its exclusive jurisdiction, 181
-'.
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Additionally, it U also recommended that the United States "spe-
cial narltiat and territorial ju. L.ion" be amended to include
the following subsection under the definition of that jurisdic-
tion in or^er to exteL ates law to:
Any manned installation or structure placed or
erected upon or near the ocean floor underlying the high
seas belong t-t to the tates
or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by
or under the laws of the Unit;' 'es, or of any State,
Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such
istallation or structure is within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out
the jurisdiction of any particular "tate.
These two amendments, using the suggested wording or wore1
of similar import, would go far to erase neet of the certainty
with regard to the applicability of the traditional doctrines of
criminal jurisdiction t arena. jdiction
would be based on o an established doctrine which lias
Cound accept law of nations. It would accord with
present practice, for as ecretary-General reported to the
General ' ty that the flag State concept has so far "been
applied in the easels, illations and other devices
engaged in •< exploration and exploitation" and "in the case
of fijed installations jurisdiction has been exercised by the coastai.
State under whose authority they were installed ,"18- "tate
competent to exercise jurisdiction would be more readily identi-
fiable to individuals and to State the persons falling within

62
the jurisdiction would know beforehand the law to which they
were answerable. Both nationals and aliens would fail under the
scope of the same law, and needless issues of the precise geographic
location of the criminal act, whether at the edge of or beyond 200
meters of depth, or whether at the ocean floor or above within the
water column, would not be raised. Lastly, a more comprehensive
code would be extended to submarine installations, in the same
ashion that more or less territorial code reaches vessels on the
high seas. By these criteria, it is submitted that expressly treating
a manned installation or structure located in ocean space by the same
legal analysis that confers criminal jurisdiction to ships is a
legitimate, reasonable and effective solution that commands itself
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